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After the collapse of the Soviet Union, ethnically, linguistically and 
culturally diverse successor states were left behind. As these states 
tried to form domestic policies and governing institutions, the inter-
ests of their various populations were (and still are) often in conflict. 
Civil war erupted in Tajikistan and Georgia. Riots swept Kyrgyzstan. 
Armed conflicts broke out in Moldova and Russia. But others, have 
shown that multiculturalism needn’t always result in widespread, 
violent conflict.
The Politics of the Black Sea Region are affected with many 
diverse political, security and economic interests. The region is a 
dynamic and complex area in which many national and interna-
tional actors have key interests, including Russia, the US and EU. 
The European Union stretches to the sea’s western coast, where 
it meets former Soviet territory as well as EU candidate Turkey. 
Changing relationships with the USA, China, as well as with insti-
tutions such as the European Union and NATO, are shaping the 
security agendas of states in the region and beyond. 
Regional tensions include those over NATO enlargement, a 
US anti-ballistic missile system, access to the Black Sea, democ-
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Introduction
ratization, spheres of interest and the conflict zones of Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria. In addition, 
the region’s close proximity to the Caspian basin offers the pros-
pect of alternative energy resources and routes to western states. 
(Weaver, 2013)
Moreover, the region is affected with other security threats and 
challenges, including energy politics; insurgency; transnational or-
ganised crime; and the domestic, regional, and geopolitical impact 
of the “colour revolutions”.
25 years after the dissolution of USSR, several ancestor states 
have made significant progress towards building independent dem-
ocratic states. Besides, the recent “orange” and “velvet revolutions” 
in Ukraine and Georgia have been considered a flagship model 
for urging further democratization processes in post-Soviet states. 
The positive impacts of these “success stories” are closely 
linked to factors such as the socializing role of the European Union 
and NATO in the region. Moreover, other international organizations 
(such as CoE and OSCE) are plugged in improving mechanisms for 
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the purpose of better human rights situation and political stability. 
Yet, these developments are contrasted by the current situ-
ation in Central Asia and the Caucasus, where democratization 
efforts have either stalled, not been initiated or were met by a pol-
icy of the iron fist. It is a tragic irony that the conflict between 
Georgia and Russia over secessionist South Ossetia in Au-
gust 2008 might be considered a further illustration of how 
differently democracy has taken root in the area and how con-
flicting geopolitical agendas of various actors might affect the 
outcome of democracy promotion efforts and their effects for 
regional security. (Bosold D., 2009) 
Current democratization processes of Post-Soviet space is 
not is complimentary for Russia. Creating insecurities (military 
confrontations, energy leverage, economic (trade) wars, etc.) 
has been approved mechanism of Russian foreign policy towards 
Black Sea democracies. Specifically, Russia used the ultimate 
goal of its foreign policy against Georgia and Ukraine, with the 
aim to prevent them from turning to the Euro-Atlantic direction and 
demonstrate to other Post-Soviet states that explosive democrati-
zation might not lead to the proclaimed goals of stability, prosperity 
and security. As soon as the new democratic elites (after colored 
revolutions) of Georgia and Ukraine proclaimed intention to join 
NATO and the EU, a number of diverse crises erupted in their bi-
lateral relations with Russia. This become official justification of 
sudden interruptions of gas supply for Georgia, embargo for im-
port of Georgian wine and mineral water and other Ukrainian dairy 
products and was crowned with ultimate increase of gas prices for 
both countries. 
Herewith, the most adverse in the process is the hard power 
politics manifested by Russia against Georgia and Ukraine. New 
armed conflicts have broken out, as Russian-Georgian war con-
cluded with 20% occupation of Georgian territories and as unfor-
tunate current events in Ukraine that seem to change on a weekly, 
if not daily basis. In reacting to the pro-Western regime change in 
Ukraine in February 2014 by reincorporating Crimea into Russia, 
and later by supporting an anti-Kiev revolt in the eastern Donbas 
region, Russia broke free from the U.S. domination in post-Cold 
War system and openly challenged Washington. (Guseletov, 2015)
The recent developments of political policies in regional states 
highlight the different trajectories and processes of democratiza-
tion in states of former communist rule. The experience gained 
through ongoing democratization processes measure level of de-
mocracies in general, successful cases and current challenges 
and obstacles to democratization. Thus, further highlighting the 
lessons that should be learned from soviet past and emphasizing 
directions for future democracies. 
The Soviet Legacy 
After dismantling the former Soviet republics encountered the 
challenge to secure their independence by building decent inter-
national institutional arrangements of political and economic char-
acter. Indeed, newly emerged independent States had to solve 
serious problem of making alliances with international political and 
economic structures in order to maintain peace and security. In or-
der to cope with numerous threats and challenges regional states 
needed quite clear understanding of the national economic and 
political policies in the long-term perspective. 
According to the general analysis of trends characterizing dif-
ferent arrangements of Post-Soviet republics, we can conclude 
that majority of the regional states rather active in searching for 
allies inside and outside of the region. However, practical gains of 
virtually all regional arrangements are rather modest. 
It is obvious that any successful regional cooperation critically 
depends upon the selection of proper allies. It is clear that Russia 
still remains an important political and economic partner for some 
post-soviet republics and important security partner for few of them. 
The following reasons are justifying this assumption: 
Firstly, Russia still remains an important economic and political 
partner for most of accessory states because of historical reasons. 
This fact can be attributed mostly to the heritage from old centralized 
Soviet system and somehow inert processes of recovering from the 
soviet ascendancy. 
Secondly, Russia still exercises regional hegemony over the 
post-Soviet states through the means of employing different tactics. 
The Russian plan is rather simple: Punish countries that refuse to 
come under its influence, while rewarding countries and political 
leaders that cooperate with Russia with lucrative political and se-
curity deals.
Thirdly, Energy sector and transportation of oil and gas have 
become already (and will be in the future) important factors shaping 
relations in the post-Soviet space. For many countries the further 
economic development depends on successful construction of pipe-
lines and transportation networks. 
Taking into consideration all above-mentioned, dissolution of 
Soviet Union, a traumatic break-up for all states. Like a marriage, 
majority of property was jointly earned and owned, thus, it was hard 
to make a clean break. Transition period - that is still going on - has 
not been easy for any assessor state. Rather, after the collapse of 
the USSR former Soviet republics have clearly demonstrated two 
principal ways of political and economic self-determination, compris-
ing both -international and regional dimensions.
The first one can be tentatively named “Baltic way”. This strat-
egy in practical terms means joining existing political and economic 
organizations like NATO, Council of Europe and EU. And now we 
can say that this strategy was successfully implemented by Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania. This strategy has a clear distinctive feature – 
avoidance of any strong institutionalized ties with the former Soviet 
republics. (Burakovsky, n.d.) Soon after declaring independence, all 
of three Baltic republics have officially declared EU membership as 
the national priority. At the same time rejecting the very idea of par-
ticipating in any regional arrangements with other post-soviet repub-
lics. These countries have positioned themselves politically beyond 
the bounds of economic and political groupings emerged on the 
post-Soviet space. Since 1990, the economies of Baltic States have 
grown around fourfold and democratic achievements are exemplary. 
The second strategy can be named as a “mixed” one in the 
sense that in this case former Soviet republics have been trying to 
combine accession to existing political and economic organizations 
(like NATO, WTO, closer relations with EU, etc.) with searches for 
different interstate institutional arrangements on the post-Soviet 
space. In fact we can say that this strategy consists of two elements: 
Pro-regional component (that is establishing different structures 
on the post-Soviet space) and
External component (joining different arrangements outside CIS 
area). (Burakovsky, n.d.)
The third strategy can be named as “a (lone) way” - We have 
already discussed two strategies above, whereas there is a third 
strategy as well. When 3 Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithu-
ania) and four CIS countries (representatives of a mixed strategy) 
have already accessed to WTO, Turkmenistan did not apply for ac-
cession at all. 
This is a clear implication of so called “third strategy”, compris-
ing the state that does not consider regional or international coop-
eration an important factor shaping state’s political and economic 
wellbeing. Nowadays, the region has attracted attention of powerful 
international economic and political organizations, who have their 
own interests within the region and have subsequent impact on 
economic and political affairs. Today, into so complex world, it is 
almost inconceivable for a small, not signified states to survive and 
operate without proper having regional or international cooperation. 
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In the 22 years since the dissolution of
the Soviet Republic, some economies
have grown faster than other. Here we
track the change in gross national
incomes in Russia`s sphere of influence.
All amounts converted to
international dollars using
purchasing power parity rates



















































No nation is home alone. Famine of international cooperation and 
alliances decrease the capacity of any state to manage global se-
curity threats and risks alone. 
The map below shows changes in the post-Soviet countries’ 
gross national income in 1993 and 2012. Indicating different levels 
of international dimensions, countries characterized with regional 
and/or international cooperation trend to achieve higher level of 
economic growth that so called “landlocked” states. (Dunnett, 2015)
All post-soviet states except Belarus, Tajikistan and Turkmen-
istan have some contractual relations with EU (see Table 1) The 
growing importance of the EU as a strong political ally  has urged the 
development of a wide range of cooperative mechanisms between 
the EU and its post-soviet neighbours. The EU enlargement process 
to include countries in Central and Eastern Europe has shed light on 
new territorial horizons by bringing parts of the former Soviet space 
into the EU’s focus. (Moga, T. Lucian, & Alexeev D., 2013)
The EU’s expansion to the East has a structural nature, chang-
ing the long-term international structures that shape the nature 
of EU-Russian interaction. First, EU enlargement cements new 
governance linkages and behaviours for some of Russia’s closest 
neighbours. Second, enlargement poses choices for Russia’s other 
important previously absent neighbours (such as Ukraine, Belarus 
and Georgia). Finally, the inclusion in the European market of Rus-
sia’s formerly most important trading partners challenges the very 
nature of Russia’s own approach to building a market economy. 
(DeBardeleben, n.d.)     
  
While taking into an account, that small and economically and 
politically comparatively weak states, as a rule, cannot consistently 
ensure external security without support from large and strong al-
lies or being a part of some group system of security, the second 
necessary condition is first the desire of the powers or power cen-
ters, interested in this region, and then agreement on turning the 
region from an arena of economic or military-political confrontation 













Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 1 July 1999
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 1 July 1999
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, signed in March 1995 but is 
not yet in force. The Interim agreement is also not in force
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 1 July 1999
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 1 July 1999
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 1 July 1999
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 1 July 1999
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 1 December 1997
No Partnership and Cooperation Agreement proposed
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in May 1998 but is not 
yet in force. The interim agreement is not yet in force
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 1 March 1998
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 1 July 1999
Country      Agreement, entered in force
Final Remarks 
Let us remember that the main threats and consequently, the fac-
tors of security, which are universally well known: military, politi-
cal, economic (energy can be distinguished separately, due to the 
special significance of energy resources and prominent threats of 
manipulating with energy resources in lucrative political deals), so-
cial (which includes human rights, demography, etc.), cultural and 
informational.  Already for quite a lengthy period of time, terrorism 
has been singled out as a separate threat, which started more and 
more actively exploiting the Eurasian space.
It is known, that in spite of existence of admissible threats on 
various levels, they still affect security and that, when talking about 
Map 1: Post -Soviet countries` gross national income in 1993 and 2012. (Hromadske International)
Table 2: Agreements between EU and the Former Soviet Republics
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security, even if only one component is missing, one cannot talk 
anymore about “consistent and stable” security (thus, for example, 
it is practically impossible for states of the region to have common 
environmental threats and a common system of environmental se-
curity and different military-political threats and systems of security; 
maybe “on different levels”, but not different).  
Proceeding from the abovementioned, every person, state or 
region, if they want to have realistic, stable and consistent security, 
need security with all of its component parts.  
“Conflict” is undoubtedly a main threat to security at all levels, 
starting with the family and ending with the world.  In conditions 
of conflict inside the “levels” or between them, it is impossible to 
ensure real, stable and consistent security.  
In accordance with the above-mentioned assumptions, it is also 
known, that in order to create a real, stable and consistent system 
of security, you need to do the following: 
Objectively and accurately define the existing and potential 
threats and challenges (difficulties – objective and subjective cri-
teria);
Neutralize the conflict threats (through preventive activities);
In case of existing conflicts, resolve them as quickly as possible 
or consolidate conflict management processes.  
Furthermore, for small, comparatively weak states (such as 
majority of former soviet republics), the main domestic and daily 
challenging threat is still an undemocratic state system. Its main 
characteristics are: undemocratic (or insufficiently democratic) 
Constitution and electoral legislation.
- As a consequence: corrupt Parliament and undemocratic 
laws;
- As a consequence: corrupt and undemocratic executive and 
judicial systems. 
All of the above causes: ignoring of the law, corruption and re-
fusal to implement any democratic reforms, not just from the side of 
the executive and judicial authority, but, what is possibly more sig-
nificant, from the side of the population of the country. As a result, 
you end up with a “pseudo or failed state” and constant economic 
crisis and social tension, inability to resolve the conflicts existing 
inside the country, as well as the threat of arising of new conflicts 
and collapse of integrity of the country, which constantly cause de-
stabilization in the broader region.        
Indeed, main foreign threats of a country proceed exactly from 
its main domestic threats and are predetermined both by weakness 
of the national security system of the country itself and by attempts 
of outside hostile powers and power centers to contribute to this 
weakness and use it (including “conservation” of the existing con-
flicts and provoking new ones), in order to establish their influence 
over the country.       
As a result, we end up with a weak defense capacity of the 
state and an inefficient and uncalculated foreign policy, disillusion-
ment of foreign friendly or benevolent powers and international 
organizations, weakening (possible termination) of their economic 
and political assistance and, in the final run, lack of existence of an 
effective national security system of the country.  (Zhgenti, 2009)
Conclusion 
Security assurance in the region under consideration is essential 
for the member states, for the following reasons: firstly, due to the 
historic and geographic reasons security issues for many years 
have been more important in this region rather than in other ones. 
Secondly, the living conditions of the millions of their citizens or 
representatives of their nationalities are not just an issue for their 
own governments. Thirdly, security guarantees National interests of 
Post-Soviet countries in the region, which are: 
1) Maintaining friendly relations with their neighbors, regardless 
of who is in power in these countries;
2) Prevention of “transit” security threats arising outside the 
region;
3) Ensuring internal stability and the absence of conflicts be-
tween them. (Guseletov, 2015)
If the above defined domestic threats are present in at least 
one or several countries of a region, they exceptionally intensify 
outside threats, not just for separate states of the region, but for 
the region as a whole. This is especially apparent in such regions, 
which are objects of attention, and consequently confrontation, of 
leading world powers or power centers, due to their special strate-
gic, economic and military-political significance.   
The most important of these conditions are, first of all, exis-
tence of a high level of ensuring internal security of the regional 
states and agreement between these states for finding ways to 
avoid existent common threats and challenges. Nowadays, estab-
lishing a real, stable and consistent system of regional security is 
possible only in theory and only provided that there undoubtedly 
exist several extremely significant conditions.  
The most affective and enduring formula for strengthening se-
curity in the region and eliminating most prominent military-political 
security challenges could be preserving balance of power in the 
region. Thus, balancing interests of all role-players in the region 
and at the same time achieving collective security partnership of 
regional states could be a guarantee of maintaining stability and 
security in Post-Soviet Space. The role of civil society institutions is 
also promising in conflict management and resolution processes in 
united Post-Soviet space. Regional cooperation and unification is 
an essential tool in sake of regional prosperity and finding solutions 
for vital risks and threats. Post-soviet society should agree on col-
lective effort and start cooperation from regional priorities. 
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